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Abstract
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identication of model primitives
for rst-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specic,
unobservable sets of potential bidders.
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1 Introduction
Identication in auctions has been an active area of recent research in industrial organi-
zation. Beginning with the seminal contributions of Guerre et al. (2000) and Athey and
Haile (2002), the literature has explored nonparametric identication of a variety of auction
models under progressively weaker assumptions on observables.1
We contribute to this literature by showing nonparametric identication for rst-price
auctions with a binding reserve price r where the set of potential bidders varies from auction
to auction and is unobservable. Those potential bidders whose valuations are lower than
the reserve price r do not bid (enter). We assume independent private values (IPV). The
model allows for ex-ante asymmetries among bidders. Specically, we assume that bidders
may belong to di¤erent groups.2 We assume that only auctions that have attracted at least
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 514 848 2424 ext 5288. Fax: +1 514 848 4536. E-mail addresses:
achneero@alcor.concordia.ca (A. Shneyerov), wongchileung@gmail.com (A.C.L. Wong)
yThe authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and the associate editor for their comments.
1See also a recent book by Paarsch et al. (2006).
2This approach is adopted in Athey et al. (2004), Flambard and Perrigne (2006), Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2009) and Hubbard and Paarsch (2008).
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one actual bidder are observable.3 The objects we seek to identify are (a) the distribution
of valuations Fi () for each bidder i, over and above the reserve price, and (b) p (), the
distribution of the sets of potential bidders. We show that these objects are identiable
under conditions that are standard in the theoretical analyses of asymmetric auctions.
As in Paarsch (1997), Athey et al. (2004), Song (2005), Li and Zheng (2009), Adams
(2007) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009), our basic identifying assumption is that bid-
dersvaluations do not depend on the set of potential bidders. This is a plausible assumption
in many applications. For example, in highway procurement auctions, bidders must be pre-
qualied to participate in the auction based on the ability to perform the work rather than
on their costs.4 Another good example is the procurement of services and materials by the
US Government Printing O¢ ce (GPO), where bidders are invited to participate through
rotating lists.5
To illustrate the idea of our identication method, consider a symmetric setting. (We
allow asymmetry in our analysis.) Since only the bidders with valuations over and above
the reserve price r actually submit bids, the entry probability is 1 F (r). The identication
of this probability is crucial as it is necessary for the identication of both primitive objects
in (a) and (b) above.
Assume that the number of potential bidders N has support

N;N + 1; :::; N
	
. Then
the number of actual bidders n has support

0; 1; :::; N
	
. Since the support of n is observ-
able, N is identiable (in fact, can be consistently estimated as the sample maximum of n).
When n takes the maximal possible value N , the number of potential bidders is observable
and also equal to N .
To identify the entry probability, we use the following trick: when the number of actual
bidders is n = N   1, the distribution of bids G  jn = N   1 is a mixture of two compo-
nents. The rst component is the distribution of bids conditional on the number of potential
bidders N = N , and the second is the distribution of bids conditional on N = N   1. The
mixture weights are the probabilities of N = N and N = N  1, conditional on the number
of actual bidders n = N   1. Using a theoretical result that the upper bounds of bid
supports are ordered (also proved in the paper), we show that these mixture weights are
identied. They in turn identify the entry probability for every bidder.
We can now identify the distribution of valuations above the reserve price from the
distribution of bids G
 jn = N using standard methods, as in Guerre et al. (2000). Also,
we can exploit the fact that the distribution of the number of n given N is Binomial with
parameter 1   F (r), and the marginal distribution of n is directly observable, to identify
the distribution of the number of potential bidders N . (This is despite the fact that only
the auctions that have attracted at least one actual bidder are observable.)
The above discussion presumes that all submitted bids are observable. In (strategically
equivalent) Dutch auctions, only the winning bids can be observed by the econometrician.
Still, if all bidder identities are observable, we prove that our identication results extend
to Dutch auctions. (The proof uses the results in Berman (1963) and Athey and Haile
(2002).)
Hu and Shum (forthcoming 2010), in a paper that is closely related and was concur-
3See Hendricks and Porter (2007) for a discussion of the empirical relevance of this assumption.
4Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009).
5See http://www.gpo.gov:80/pdfs/vendors/sfas/ppr.pdf for a description of GPO auction rules.
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rently written, consider identication and estimation of a model similar to ours. The main
di¤erence is that they allow the distribution of valuations to depend on the number of po-
tential bidders. (Another di¤erence is that they restrict attention to a symmetric model.)
They show that identication nevertheless obtains provided an instrument is available that
exogenously determines the number of potential bidders.6 Their methods are based on
recent results in the literature on misclassied regressors and are di¤erent from ours.
Several other papers in the empirical auction literature are related to our paper. Paarsch
(1997), in his study of the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) in British
Columbia, estimates that the average number of actual bidders is about 3.29. Due to non-
participation caused by a binding reserve price, the number of potential bidders exceeds
the number of actual bidders. But if one uses a crude measure of the number of potential
bidders such as the number of rms registered in the district of the auction, the number of
potential bidders could be as high as 185. Clearly, with this measure, one would substan-
tially overestimate the level of potential competition in the majority of auctions. Paarsch
(1997) adopts a clever parametric estimation strategy that is based on conditional likeli-
hood and eliminates the need to estimate the number of potential bidders. However, his
approach is limited to ascending-bid (English) auctions.
Song (2005) and Adams (2007) consider identication and estimation of eBay auctions
with an unknown number of potential bidders. Their methods are tailored for eBay auctions
and are entirely di¤erent from ours. Song (2005) shows that the joint distribution of any
two order statistics identies the parent distribution. She then applies this result to eBay
auctions, by arguing that in equilibrium, the second and third highest bidders bid truthfully.
She develops a nonparametric estimator based on her identication result. Adams (2007)
shows that, under certain additional assumptions, observing just the transaction price is
su¢ cient for identication.
Most of the papers that estimated rst-price auctions approached the measurement of
potential competition empirically. In some cases, such a measure is readily available. For
example, in highway procurement auctions conducted by state departments of transporta-
tion, the list of eligible rms is sometimes publicly released and can serve as a good proxy
for potential competition (e.g. Li and Zheng (2009), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2009) and
Marmer et al. (2007)). In other cases, researchers have used geographic proximity as a
basis for rm inclusion in the set of potential bidders (Athey et al. (2004), Hendricks et al.
(2003)).
Since the structural auction estimates are sensitive to the measure of potential compe-
tition (Hendricks and Porter (2007)), another approach is to treat the number of potential
bidders as a parameter to be estimated, as in La¤ont et al. (1995). Ideally, this parameter
would be auction specic, so a model for potential competition would be estimated jointly
with the model of bidding. Nonparametric identication of the entire model is necessary
as a foundation for such an approach, and our results provide such a foundation.
6After the revision work on this paper was completed, we have become aware of a new version of Hu
and Shum (forthcoming 2010) where identication is also shown without the instrument. More exactly, a
second bid in the auction may serve this purpose.
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2 The model
We consider IPV rst-price auctions. Bidders are ex-ante asymmetric: we assume that
there are m groups of bidders. Within each group the bidders draw valuations from the
same distribution Fi, but the distributions Fi may be di¤erent across the groups. The set
of groups is denoted asM f1; 2;    ;mg . The number of potential bidders in group i is
denoted as Ni, and we write N  (N1;    ; Nm). We refer to such an auction as N -auction.
Our most important identifying assumption is that the distribution of valuations does not
depend on the composition of bidder groups. (In the symmetric case, this is equivalent to
the requirement that the distribution of biddersvaluations does not depend on the number
of potential bidders.)
Assumption 1 The distributions of biddersvaluations do not depend on N , i.e. 8N;N 0 2
Zm+ with Ni; N 0i > 0 we have Fi (vjN) = Fi (vjN 0)  Fi (v).
This assumption rules out cases when the decision to become a potential bidder is corre-
lated with the would-be bidders valuation, for example. We assume that each distribution
Fi has the same support, denoted as [v; v], is di¤erentiable on the support, and has den-
sity fi which is bounded away from zero on its support.7 The vector N , the distributions
Fi (jN), and the reserve price r are assumed to be commonly known to the bidders. In this
setting, Maskin and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1999) have shown existence and uniqueness
of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies Bi (jN).8 These results imply that bidders
from the same group must use identical bidding strategies.
Nonparticipation in an auction is due to the existence of a binding reserve price r 2
(v; v). We assume that the numbers of potential bidders in each auction are unobservable
(to the econometrician): only the bidders with valuations at least as high as the reserve
price r submit serious bids. We treat non-serious bids as uninformative and ignore them.
From now on, it will be assumed that every bidder submits a bid only if his valuation is
at least r, thereby becoming an actual bidder. The number of actual bidders in group i is
denoted as ni, and we write n  (n1;    ; nm). The decision to become an actual bidder is
called the entry decision. Only the auctions that have attracted at least one actual bidder
are assumed to be registered in the dataset.
Assumption 2 The identities of bidders and their bids in each auction are observable by
the econometrician.9 The reserve price is also observable and constant across auctions.
This assumption implies that the vector n of the numbers of actual bidders in each
group, is observable if
Pm
i=1 ni > 0. Denote the C.D.F. of bids from a group i bidder,
conditional on entry and the vector of potential bidders N , as Gi (jN) (Ni > 0). From the
7 Identical supports is a standard assumption in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions. See
e.g. Lebrun (1999). Little is known in general about the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium without
this assumption. Also, if the supports are not identical, there exist reserve prices for which the low types
are always screened and the identication argument would not go through in general.
8See also Bajari (2001).
9 In fact, only the identities of biddersgroups, rather than that of bidders, need to be observed. It in
particular implies that, in a symmetric setting (i.e. there is only one group), the identities are not required
to be observed.
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econometricians point of view, N is randomly drawn from some probability distribution
p and is unobservable. In other words, N is treated as an auction-specic e¤ect. Since N
is unobservable, the data do not reveal this C.D.F. They only reveal the C.D.F. of bids
conditional on the numbers of actual bidders Gi (bjn) (ni > 0).
The support of p is denoted as S, i.e. p (N) > 0 if and only if N 2 S. Both p and S are
unobservable.
Assumption 3 For every group i 2 M, there exists some N 2 S such that Ni  2. More
succinctly, [N2S fi : Ni  2g =M.
Without this assumption, we cannot guarantee that equilibrium bidding strategies are
strictly increasing on [r; v], at least in some auction, for all groups, so that identication of
Fi (v) for v 2 [r; v] might fail.10
A bidder from group i becomes active if v  r, i.e. with probability 1   Fi (r). Since
bidders draw their valuations independently, the distribution of n conditional on N is
multinomial, with probabilities
 (njN) =
mY
i=1

Ni
ni

[1  Fi(r)]ni [Fi(r)]Ni ni (n  N) : (1)
These probabilities are not observable. The marginal probabilities of n are
 (n) =
X
N2S
p (N) (njN) :
The support of  is denoted as s. Since the econometrician only observes the auctions with
at least one active bidder, the marginal probabilities  (n) are also unobservable; only the
conditional probabilities
 (n) =
 (n)
1   (0)
 
mX
i=1
ni > 0
!
(2)
are observable.
3 Main results
The primitives that we seek to identify are Fi () for every i 2 M, and p (N) for every
N 2 S. Before we turn to our results, consider the case when N is observable. Then the
distribution Gi (jN) and the p (N) are also observable, and we can identify Fi (r) from e.g.
Pr fni = 1jNg = Ni (1  Fi (r))Fi (r)Ni 1 :
The distributions Fi (vjv  r) can be identied from rst-order equilibrium conditions fol-
lowing the approach of Guerre et al. (2000).11 Denote inverse bidding strategies as i (bjN).
10See Lebrun (1999) and our Appendix for details.
11See also the discussion in Athey and Haile (2005).
5
If b > r and Ni > 0, the inverse bidding strategies i (bjN) can be found from the rst-order
conditions12
i(bjN) = b+
8<:
mX
j=1
Njg

j (bjN)
Gj (bjN) + Fj(r)1 Fj(r)
  g

i (bjN)
Gi (bjN) + Fi(r)1 Fi(r)
9=;
 1
; (3)
where gi (jN) is the density of Gi (jN). Since Fi (r) is identiable, this leads to the
identication of group is bidding strategy Bi (vjN) for v > r, and consequently of the
distributions of valuations conditionally on entry, Fi (vjv  r) = Gi (Bi (vjN) jN), and also
unconditionally,
Fi (v) = [1  Fi (r)]Fi (vjv  r) + Fi (r) (v > r) :
When N is unobservable, the distributions Gi (jN) are in general also unobservable,
but there are special cases in which they are observable. Let S and s be the maximal sets
of the numbers of potential and actual bidders respectively:13
S   N 2 S : @N 2 S s.t. N < N	 ;
s  fn 2 s : @n 2 s s.t. n < ng :
Lemma 1 (Identication of the Maxiamal Set S) We have S = s. Since s is observ-
able, the maximal set S is identiable.
Proof. For any N 2 S, we have  (njN) > 0 if and only if n  N . Therefore,
s = fn : n  N for some N 2 Sg :
The result immediately follows. Q.E.D.
A typical element of S is denoted as N .14
Remark 1 Assumption 3 implies that all bidder types are represented in S, i.e. 8i 2 M
9 N 2 S such that Ni > 0 (in fact, Ni  2).
When the number of actual bidders is maximal, i.e. n = N for some N 2 S, obviously
Gi (jn) = Gi (jn). Since the latter distribution is observable, Gi
 j N is identiable for
all N 2 S and i such that Ni > 0. Our discussion of the observable N case then implies
that, if the entry probabilities f1  Fj (r)gmj=1 are identiable, then Fi (vjv  r) are also
identiable for all i 2M.
12For the derivation of (3), see Appendix.
13We use the convention that: for any two vectors x1 and x2 of the same dimension, x1 < x2 means
x1  x2 and x1 6= x2.
14An important issue is how to determine the maximal set S in practice when bidders are asymmetric.
From the practical perspective, it may be convenient to make a stronger assumption that the support is
rectangular: S =
Qm
i=1fN i; :::; Nig. Then S =

N
	
and each Ni can be consistently estimated as the
sample maximum of ni, essentially in the same way as is commonly done in the symmetric model.
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Our main result shows that Fi (r) and p (N) are in fact identiable. Denote the support
of group is bid distribution in the auction with the number of potential bidders N as
r;b (N)

. (Recall that, even though bidders draw their valuations from distributions that
may be di¤erent, the upper bounds of the supports are common for all bidders.) Our
identication proof will rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 2 b (N) is strictly increasing in N .
It is well known that Lemma 2 always holds in a symmetric IPV model, i.e. when
bidders draw their valuations from the same distribution. In the Appendix, we prove it in
general. The bounds b
 
N

for N 2 S are identiable. It is because for N 2 S, we observe
G
 j N and the bound b   N is identied as the upper bound of the support of G  j N.
Our main result is the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Fi (r) and p (N) are identiable.
Proof. It is convenient to denote the conditional distribution of N  n given n as
 (N jn). By Bayes rule,
 (N jn) =  (njN) p (N)
 (n)
: (4)
Fix an arbitrary group i 2 M. Pick an N 2 S such that Ni > 0. Remark 1 implies that
such a choice is possible. We rst show that 
 
N j N i

, where
N i 
 
N1;    ; Ni 1; Ni   1; Ni+1;    ; Nm

;
is identiable.
Notice that
1 Gi (bjn) =
X
N :Nn
 (N jn) [1 Gi (bjN)] : (5)
Lemma 2 implies b
 
N i

< b
 
Ni

. Thus if b 2  b   N i ;b   Ni, we have
1 Gi
 
bj N i

= 
 
N j N i
 
1 Gi
 
bj N :
On the other hand, when n = N , the sum in (5) contains only one term, equal to 1  
Gi
 
bj N. It follows that

 
N j N i

= lim
b"b( N)
1 Gi
 
bj N i

1 Gi
 
bj N (6)
is identiable.
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We now show how to recover Fi (r) from 
 
N j N i

. First note that

 
N j N = mY
i=1
[1  Fi (r)] Ni ;

 
N ij N

= Ni (1  Fi (r)) Ni 1 Fi (r) 
Y
j 6=i
[1  Fj (r)] Nj ;
= Ni
Fi (r)
1  Fi (r)
 
N j N :
Then from (4), taking into account (1),

 
N j N i

=

 
N ij N

p
 
N


 
N i

= Ni
Fi (r)
1  Fi (r)
 
N j N p   N

 
N i
 :
We can combine this equation with

 
N j N = p   N   N j N

 
N
 = 1
to eliminate p (N). This yields
Fi (r)
1  Fi (r) =
1
Ni

 
N j N i
    N i

 
N
 : (7)
From (2),

 
N i


 
N
 =    N i

 
N
 ;
and therefore (7) implies
Fi (r)
1  Fi (r) =
1
Ni

 
N j N i
    N i

 
N
 : (8)
Since the right-hand side of this equation contains only identiable quantities, Fi (r) is
identiable for each i 2M.
Finally, we can recover p (N) from the total probability equations. For  = 1    (0),
the law of total probability implies the following system of linear equations for p (N):
 (n) 
X
N :Nn
 (njN) p (N) = 0: (9)
Since Fi (r) are identiable,  (njN) are also identiable; see (1). Formally, consider the
above system for any  2 (0; 1). Write p (N) as P (N;) to make the dependency on 
explicit. Since the probabilities P (N;) enter the right-hand side of (9) only for N  n,
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the system has a recursive structure that allows one to uniquely determine P (N;) for all
N . To see this most easily, we can use an induction argument. Begin with those N 2 S,
we have
P (N;) =
 (N)
 (N jN) : (10)
Next, for any given N =2 S, if p (N 0; ) are known for all N 0 > N , and we can determine
P (N;) from (9) according to
P (N;) =
1
 (N jN) 
"
 (N) 
X
N 0:N 0>N

 
N jN 0P  N 0; # : (11)
To determine , note that as a solution of a linear system, P (N;) is homogeneous of
degree 1 in , so that P (N;) = P (N; 1). For  = 1   (0), the law of total probability
implies
(1   (0))
X
N2S
P (N; 1) = 1;
Since P (N; 1) are now known, the above equation uniquely determines  (0). Therefore
p (N) is identied: p (N) = (1   (0))P (N; 1). Q.E.D.
Remark 2 We have chosen to abstract from observable auction heterogeneity, a feature
almost always present in auction data. But we should stress that all our results are ap-
plicable under observable auction heterogeneity. The variation in reserve prices can also
be considered as a form of observed heterogeneity. In such a model, one seeks to identify
F (vjx) and p (N jx), where x is a vector of auction characteristics that may also include r.
All our previous results go through if we use conditional distributions Gi (jn; x) in place of
Gi (jn). In particular, the distribution F (vjx) is identiable for v  r.
4 Extension to Dutch auctions
In this section, we show that our result generalizes to Dutch auctions, where only the
winning bid is observable. We continue to assume that the identities of actual bidders are
observable. Fix an N 2 S. Restrict attention to auctions with n = N and groups with
Ni > 0. LetWi be the highest bid submitted from group i (with Ni > 0). LetW  maxiWi
be the winning bid. And let I be the identity of the winning group, i.e. W =WI .
Our data directly reveals the joint distribution of (I;W ) conditional on n = N (which
also implies N = N):
Hi(wj N)  Pr
 
I = i & W  wjn = N :
Begin by recovering Hi (j N) the C.D.F. of Wi conditional on n = N = N . The set of
functions

Hi(j N)
	
is related to the set

Hi (j N)
	
via the functional equations
Hi(wj N) =
Z w
r
Y
j 6=i
Hj (tj N)dHi (tj N):
9
One can verify (see Berman (1963) and Athey and Haile (2002)) that the solution for
Hi (j N)
	
is given by
Hi (wj N) = exp
8<: 
Z 1
w
24X
j
Hj(tj N)
35 1 dHi(tj N)
9=; : (12)
Since the right-hand side of (12) contains only observable objects, Hi (wj N) is identiable.
Now recall that Hi (wj N) is the probability that all Ni bidders in group i submit bids below
w, conditional on n = N = N . We have
Hi (wj N) =

Gi (wj N)
 Ni ;
which proves that Gi (wj N) is identiable for every N 2 S and every i such that Ni > 0.
This implies that i (bjN) and therefore Fi (vjv  r) are identiable provided the entry
probabilities f1  Fj (r)gmj=1 are identiable. The rest of the identication proof follows
exactly parallel to that of Proposition 1.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that a rst-price IPV auction model where nonparticipation is due to a
binding reserve price, and the set of potential bidders is unobservable, is nonparametrically
identied under weak assumptions. We do not develop a nonparametric estimation method.
In developing such a method, it would be interesting to consider a situation when variation
in the reserve price is conditionally independent of N and Vi. Intuitively, this may lead to
over identication which may also help improve e¢ ciency in estimation. This may be an
interesting direction for future research.
On the other hand, from an empirical perspective, parametric assumptions are always
used in some form. Our results provide a foundation for parametric estimation methods
such as in La¤ont et al. (1995) or Donald and Paarsch (1996), but with auction-specic
number of potential bidders. Generalization to other private value auction models, e.g.
with unobserved heterogeneity, either assuming a¢ liated values as in Li et al. (2002) or
within the IPV paradigm as in Krasnokutskaya (2003), is also left for future research.
6 Appendix
This appendix sketches the derivations of equilibrium conditions, and proves Lemma 2. In
order to simplify notations, we do not divide bidders into groups like we do in the text.
The set of bidders is N with 2  jN j <1. Each bidder i draws his valuation vi from the
C.D.F. Fi ().15
From here up to the proof of Lemma 3 below, we x an N -auction, and thus suppress
the dependency of equilibrium objects on N in our notation, e.g. we write bidder is inverse
15Clearly, from the theoretical point of view the setting here is equivalent to the one we use in the text,
although they are di¤erent from the econometricians point of view.
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bidding strategy as i() rather than i(jN ). But when we prove Lemma 2, this dependency
will become explicit.
For an N -auction, bidder i solves
max
b
(vi   b)
Y
j 6=i
Fj(j(b)):
The rst-order conditions are
1
i(b)  b =
X
j 6=i
 0j(b) (13)
where  j(b)  logFj(j(b)). These rst-order conditions imply
i(b) = b+
8<:X
j
d
dbFj (j(b))
Fj (j(b))
 
d
dbFi (i(b))
Fi (i(b))
9=;
 1
(14)
Formula (3) in the text follows from (14).
Sum (13) over i and then divide through by jN j   1:
1
jN j   1
X
j
1
j(b)  b =
X
j
 0j(b): (15)
Subtract (13) from (15), we have
 0i(b) =
1
jN j   1
24X
j
1
j(b)  b  
jN j   1
i(b)  b
35 :
The above equation holds for b 2 (r;b] where b is the equilibrium maximum bid. Therefore
for all b 2 (r;b]
0i(b) =
Fi (i(b))
(jN j   1) fi (i(b))
24X
j 6=i
1
j(b)  b  
jN j   2
i(b)  b
35 : (16)
By Lebrun (1999) Theorem 1, the equilibrium is completely characterized by di¤erential
equations (16) and the following boundary conditions:
i(r+)  r for all i, and i(r+) = r except possibly one bidder
i(b) = v for all i.
Lebrun (1999) also shows existence (Theorem 2) and uniqueness (Corollary 1) of the equi-
librium.
The proof of Lemma 2 will need the following result.
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Lemma 3 If jN j  3, i 2 N , k 2 N , and i 6= k, then for all b 2 (r;b],
0i(b) <
Fi (i(b))
(jN j   2) fi (i(b))
24X
j 6=i;k
1
j(b)  b  
jN j   3
i(b)  b
35 :
Proof. From i 6= k, we can rewrite (16) and get
 0i(b) =
1
jN j   1
24X
j 6=i;k
1
j(b)  b  
jN j   3
i(b)  b +

1
k(b)  b  
1
i(b)  b
35 : (17)
From (13),
1
k(b)  b  
1
i(b)  b =  
0
i(b)   0k(b):
Substitute this into (17) and solve for  0i(b):
 0i(b) =
1
jN j   2
24X
j 6=i;k
1
j(b)  b  
jN j   3
i(b)  b    
0
k(b)
35 :
Since 0k(b) > 0 for all b 2 (r;b] and hence  0i(b) > 0 as well, we get the result.16 Q.E.D.
Now we can prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. It su¢ ces to prove b (N ) > b (Nnfkg) for allN with 2  jN j <1.
It is trivial if jN j = 2, so suppose jN j  3. Suppose by the way of contradiction that
b (N )  b (Nnfkg).
Step 1: We claim that, for small enough " > 0, we have i(bjN ) > i(bjNn fkg) for all
b 2  b (N )  ";b (N ) and all i 2 Nnfkg.
This claim is obviously true if b (N ) < b (Nnfkg). If b (N ) = b (Nnfkg) = b, it can be
seen from
0i(bjN ) =
1
(jN j   1) fi(v)
 
v   b < 1(jN j   2) fi(v)  v   b = 0i(bjNn fkg):
Step 2: We claim that i(bjN ) > i(bjNn fkg) for all b 2
 
r;b (N ) and all i 2 Nnfkg.
Suppose not. Then going from b (N ) downward, Step 1 implies that there is a rst
(largest) point b 2  r;b (N ) such that i(bjN ) = i(bjNn fkg) for some i 2 Nnfkg.
Since b is the rst point, we also have j(bjN )  j(bjNn fkg) for all j 2 Nnfkg.
Then it is easy to verify that Lemma 3 implies 0i(b
jN ) < 0i(bjNn fkg). But then
i(b
 + "jN ) < i(b + "jNn fkg) for small " > 0, contradicting to the denition of b.
Step 3: It follows from Step 2 and (13) that for each i 2 Nnfkg and each b 2  r;b (N ),X
j2Nnfi;kg
 0j(bjNn fkg) >
X
j2Nnfig
 0j(bjN ) >
X
j2Nnfi;kg
 0j(bjN ):
16The result that 0k(b) > 0 is stronger than strict monotonicity of k (since 
0
k (b) might be 0 at isolated
points). For its proof, see Lebrun (1997) Lemma A2-2.
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Integrate over
 
r;b (N ) and notice that  j(b(N )jN ) = 0   j(b(N )jNn fkg) for all j,X
j2Nnfi;kg
logFj (j(r + jN )) >
X
j2Nnfi;kg
logFj (j(r + jNn fkg)) 8i 2 Nnfkg :
Therefore, for each i 2 Nnfkg, there is a j 2 Nnfi; kg such that j(r + jN ) > j(r +
jNn fkg). It follows that j(r + jN ) > j(r + jNn fkg)  r holds for at least two distinct
js in Nnfkg, contradicting the boundary condition. Q.E.D.
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